Can the governance mechanism on the eos chain break through the reality?

The controversy over the public governance mechanism has been going on for hundreds of years, and Trump’s election was once considered by many academic elites to be a sign of governance recession. Trump has many deviations from traditional political styles and policy options, and many people think that it is right. The reputation of modern governance mechanisms poses a serious challenge.

This pity for the decline of public governance was expressed by the most extreme of the philosopher Nick Land, who said that democracy has degenerated into “virtual, indulgent consumerism, financial incontinence and a political circus and TV reality show.”

However, partly because of dissatisfaction with the real governance mechanism, and partly because of the recognition of the classic freedom concept, some technical geeks are trying to use the blockchain technology to reactivate and advocate in some blockchain projects. For the radical or even more pure concept of freedom, this is the most fully demonstrated in the design of the EOS chain governance mechanism.

Governance ambition

Although EOS is also bears the nickname of air currency and big squat, but in the minds of many fans, EOS is the third generation blockchain platform after Bitcoin and Ethereum.

EOS main developer Daniel Larimer, often referred to as BM (Bytemaster), is also an iconic figure. He is currently the only person in the world who has successfully developed three decentralized systems based on blockchain technology, Bitshares, Steem and EOS. The main technical features of EOS are the trading speed of the million-level TPS and the zero transfer fee; since June 2017, EOS has carried out an epic ICO with a period of one year, raising more than 4 billion US dollars. The traditional IPO is inferior.

EOS adopts the proxy agency mechanism (Dpos), EOS Token holders vote for 21 block producers (Block producers) – Chinese translations are super nodes, and 21 super nodes are responsible for verifying transactions and recording them on the chain. It is usually said that the block process.

The DOS consensus mechanism of EOS is highly controversial because it deviates from the decentralization ideal of the blockchain. Critics believe that the decentralization mechanism is vulnerable to hackers and there are security risks; there may be collusion or conspiracy between 21 nodes, there is moral hazard, and the other 21 nodes are relatively concentrated in a few countries, facing government intervention. Legal Risk. Many articles in the analysis of Nuclear Finance have also covered these contents.

However, in addition to focusing on the criticism of 21 super nodes, a series of chaotic events after the EOS main chain went online, making its chain governance mechanism is the focus of a new round of debate.

According to the design of BM, EOS has a minimum power structure called EOS Constitution in addition to 21 super nodes. The EOS operating system uses blockchain technology to establish P2P service agreements or binding contracts between signed users. “constitution”.

These include the Core Arbitrators Forum (ECAF) and the basic governance process. The general framework is as follows:

1. Token holders voted for policy changes.

2. The arbitrator decides on the case.

3. Block producers implement policy changes and enforcement decisions.

The constitutional content combines the rules of mutual recognition to establish judicial power and applicable law. For each transaction that is signed and broadcast in the network, the signature information must include the constitutional hash value to explicitly bind the contract signer.

According to B.M’s vision, he hopes that the EOS community can build the necessary tools to create a non-violent and self-managed global community. The community will gradually complete the formalization of the arbitration process, constitutional amendments, powers, and division of responsibilities. The EOS community creates a level playing field and guarantees the right to life, liberty, property and fairness for all.

Real chaos

However, since the EOS main online line, many major disputes have broken the above-mentioned dreams.

After the EOS main online line, the main network could not be activated because the voting rate could not meet the 15% threshold.

On June 17, 21 super nodes found that seven accounts were suspected of stealing money through phishing websites, so they actively frozen the seven accounts, but before the arbitral institution made a ruling, the super node was obviously overstepped. Although the June 19th Core Arbitration Forum (ECAF) finally decided to freeze the account.

On June 23, ECAF notified all nodes to freeze the transfer of 27 accounts, and said that the reason was given later. This arbitrariness caused the community to be in turmoil.

In this process, relevant parties need to communicate through video conferences and coordinate positions. This is a great ridicule for EOS, which claims to have a third-generation blockchain.

In the context of this controversy, BM stated that although the existing “constitutional” system has lofty intentions, the arbitration system that users do not fully understand can only “cause people to flee quickly”. Therefore he suggested simply abandoning the first version of the Constitution. In his proposed new version of the Constitution, the ECAF and the community are balanced, and it will clearly define the procedures for arbitration and the rules and regulations of the block producers, the rule of the rule of man, and the code of the code.

This practice of easily changing the underlying rules is even more aroused by the blockchain society, which is considered to be a typical centralized governance mechanism.

Others have criticized BM for crossing the border, because in theory EOS is an independent ecology, BM is only the CTO of EOS development agency Block.one, and EOS has no affiliation. However, his influence in the EOS community may be enough to trigger a major shift in governance philosophy.

It can be seen that the EOS project with more than 4 billion fundraising is in the process of experimental improvement, trying to deal with all disputes by combining the advantages of the public governance system, smart contracts, and interpersonal coordination. This is indeed An ambition, but the EOS chain governance ambition is too big, the experimental process is bringing a lot of governance confusion, the possibility of a comprehensive plan to achieve success is relatively low.

Nick Saab, the father of cryptography, has previously criticized the design of EOS and believes that some completely strangers can freeze the user’s assets. This is unacceptable. EOS’s “constitution” is socially inextensible and a security loophole.

Saab ridiculed: “EOS relies on a naive constitution that relies on code that requires human explanation. In the end, it will only lead EOS to become a labor-intensive, exclusive, totally judicial-dependent blockchain, and the entire community. It has also become non-extensible.”

Imitating reality

BM is a believer in the free market. In the design of the EOS mechanism, it is obvious that it can imitate the structure of the US constitution, but super-nodes, communities, arbiters and other simplistic models based on real-world political roles have led to the current system many conflicts.

Token holders are considered to be sources of power, and super nodes are elected by the community. Under the current token structure, 21 nodes are also facing the problem of insufficient representative rate. According to the latest data, the top 10 wallet addresses with the most EOS holdings hold nearly 500 million EOS, accounting for nearly 50% of the total currency. The top 100 wallets hold a total of 750 million tokens, accounting for 75% of the total. This kind of super node elected by the currency structure must have an oligarch color.

This kind of currency structure is bound to face the problem of low participation rate. This has already been reflected in the EOS super node voting and main network activation process. To a large extent, this low participation rate is understandable. To participate in voting, it is necessary to understand the cumbersome document requirements. It takes a lot of time, and for those investors who only hold a small amount of Token, these investments are not worth the effort.

As in most mature countries, voter low voter turnout is a topic that has been criticized for a long time. The chances of ordinary voters affecting electoral representatives are very small, so their motivation to vote based on these lofty goals is very small.

However, as citizens of a particular country, interpersonal relationships, social interactions, public opinion, etc., are often inextricably linked to the state’s governance structure. It is also easy for citizens and countries to form a kind of morality based on the community. In public governance, low participation may only be a representation, and under certain opportunities, it can be quickly converted to high participation.

But in the EOS virtual community, it is difficult for community and Token holders to develop a moral and emotional connection between citizens and communities, often with only one direct interest, and their motivation is to vote for any of the highest and most reliable benefits. People, how to encourage the participation of a few people in the EOS community, activate the “civil spirit”, this is a challenge that EOS governance mechanism is difficult to overcome, and therefore it is difficult for the community to play the “constitutional” function that BM expects.

EOS’s 21 super nodes are functionally closer to the administrative system in the US constitutional structure. They are responsible for verifying transactions and packing out blocks. Super nodes also punish cheaters according to the arbitrator’s instructions, such as freezing assets of specific accounts. These behaviors often require a super-majority of 17 votes or more for the super node. In terms of this voting ratio, the operation of the super node has the shadow of the US Senate and House of Representatives on key issues.

However, everyone who knows American politics knows that the US Senate and the House of Representatives have distinct party colors. Many votes will follow the boundaries of political parties. It can be said that it is an open collusion. This political operation of political parties that emphasizes intra-party alliances and non-party confrontation. The logic between the logic and the super node is obviously different. The EOS blockchain generation mechanism requires a consensus among all nodes. However, under the temptation of different real interests, the EOS node may have collusion or conflict. The trust mechanism creates a huge risk. In fact, the current EOS nodes with Chinese colors and the EOS nodes of Western countries have formed some traces of factions.

The core arbitration forum that assumes the judicial role in the EOS Constitution has more realistic conflicts. It exists in a vague “legal” space, and its operation is under the chain. It does not have a clear procedure to follow. The EOS Core Arbitration Forum is not suitable for playing the role of the community in its current form. The current inability of the core arbitration forum poses a major challenge to the overall governance structure.

Back here, we actually need to recognize that there are many problems in the democratic mechanism, such as inefficiency and cumbersome processes. However, the real world governance mechanism has been hundreds of years, and even thousands of years of tempering and trial and error. Many problems have passed through a long period of time. Learning and error correction can be solved. To a large extent, although modern society has many dispute resolution mechanisms, it is impossible to deal with all disputes in a timely and effective manner. Even in a certain sense, disputes will evolve into violence and war.

EOS has just come online, even though it can summarize all the drawbacks of human governance mechanism in programming, but in actual operation, after all, it can’t be separated from reality. The community of EOS system design, arbitrators and super nodes are imitating real world dispute resolution. Mechanism, it will certainly face the dilemma of the real world governance mechanism, the chain governance dilemma reflected by EOS is the refraction of human weakness.

As V God commented, the oligarchy is definitely bad. EOS 21 super nodes not only imitate the oligarchy, but also imitate the failure of governance in reality.

Beautiful Utopia

Interestingly, EOS’s constitutional design contains fault-tolerant space. Opponents can use open source code and adopt their own rules to set up their own community. EOS’s chain governance mechanism can be improved in trial and error. This may be BM. The ideal beautiful utopia.

The question is whether EOS will continue to be attractive. If the governance system is in constant conflict, what attracts people to continue to participate? How deep are their beliefs about EOS for existing Token holders? Under what circumstances will they choose to vote with their feet? These questions are currently not answered. But one thing is certain, people will not give EOS unlimited time and opportunity to correct mistakes.

Trying to completely subvert or get rid of the real political order through smart contracts, artificial intelligence, science and technology, etc., seems to have become a certain trend. EOS’s ambitious governance mechanism is not the first effort to build a perfect world, in fact, including the Liberland project, the floating island project, the Podo State (Sol “Encryption Country”) and other projects (bitcoin utopia, big dreams) There is a dream of recreating a beautiful new world based on the blockchain and cryptocurrency world.

Idealism may be respectable, but the chaos since the launch of EOS and the various controversies surrounding EOS suggest that the impulse to lead a beautiful new world is obviously impossible, even dangerous.

 

Original from:VipInvestor » Can the governance mechanism on the eos chain break through the reality?

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